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Due to the various parts found in a Space Shuttle Main
Engine (SSME), analyzation of every part is not feasible or
needed. Based on previous mathematical modeling experience of
high velocity cryogenic equipment, Gray determined the
environmental traits of location of the part, temperature range,
fluid velocity, pressure range, and elevation variation of fluid
flow as being significant factors. Deborah Leath (engineer)
developed six parts categories. The part categories are: (1)
fuel turbomachinery, (2) oxidizer, (3) combustion devices, (4)
valves, (5) ducts, and (6) lines. Due to a suspicion by Gray,
that superficial failure modes exist, six status codes were
developed in consultation with Leath. The codes are: (1) part
is in service presently, (2) part is out-of-service due to its
own failure, (3) part is out-of-service due to engine (or some
other part failure), (4) part is out-of-service because it's
retired/obsolete (time related), (5) never fired-scrapped due to
own problem or part is store, and (6) part is out-of-service for
repair. Due to maintenance policies, Gray asserted that status
code 3 needed two subcodes: (I) service decision and (2)
discarded to have assess to needed repairs. Gray assigned status
code 4 with the subcodes: (I) due to age and (2) due to new
design. Based on a problem found with developing models using
status code 6, Gray decided that repair should have the 2
subcodes of: (I) problem and (2) design alteration. Gray
suggested that to properly model failure behavior of SSME parts
that: (1) significant factors contributing to failure must be
examined, (2) relative precision based on real life data must be
examined, and (3) alternative definitions of failure must be
initialized by the engineers.
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As a continuing effort to determine how Welbull analysis
methodology can be applied to Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), a
method to stratify parts in SSME was developed. The major
problem with using Weibull methodology is that frequently a beta
value of one is obtained on most SSME parts. The researcher Gray
determined that due to the real life performance of the SSME,
factors which mathematically alter the value of beta were
present. Gray also decided that the safety margin in at least
two ways provided the reason for continuous multiple failure
modes being implied by the beta value of one. Hence, Gray
decided to generate models to make an effort to analyze the
problem.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
To what extent can the SSME parts reliability be analyzed
statistical ly by using selected SSME parts based on
stratification? Is stratification a feasible effort, along with
using Weibull methodology?
PROCEDURE
During the first week of research activities, Deborah Leath
(engineer) and Lou Gray (investigator) met frequently to develop
strategies to select parts for analysis. As a result of these
activities, the following categories of major parts were
determined by Leath: (I) fuel turbomachinery, (2) oxidizer, (3)
combustion device, (4) valves, (5) ducts, and (6) lines. Based
on previous mathematical modeling experience of high velocity
cryogenic equipment, Gray determined the environmental traits of:
(I) location of the part, (2) temperature range, (3) fluid
velocity, (4) pressure range, and (5) elevation variation of
fluid flow as being significant factors (see figure 1).
Leath and Gray together develop a strategic and rational to
categorize engine parts by a status code (see figure 2). The
codes are:













CATEGORY TYPE LOCATION PRESSURE
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1. PART IN SERVICE
2. PART HASOWN FAILURE
3. PART OUT OF SERVICE
SERVICE DECISION
DISCARDED TO HAVE ASSESS TO NEEDED REPAIRS
4. RETIRED
(_ DUE TO AGE
DUE TO NEW DESIGN






. Part is out-of-service due to its own failure.
Rationale: Failed to perform as designed•
. Part is out-of-service due to engine (or some other
part failure)• Rationale: Maintenance policy
sometimes require the discarding of parts even though
the parts have not failed.
. Part is out-of-service because it's retired or
obsolete (time related)• Rationale: Aging can
result in inefficiency of the part. New designs may
replace older parts•
• Part is never-fired scrapped or part is in storage.
Rationale: Scraplng is a quality control problem•
Storage is possible occurrence•
6. Part is out-of-service due to repair.
Rational: Problem may develop. Design alterations
may occur.
The routine way of programming using Only status code 2 as a
failure and codes 3, 4, and 6 as suspension was done. The parts
examined for this study are: (I) nozzles, (2) powerheads, (3)
main combustion chamber (MCC), and (4) main injector (MI). The
models developed for this study are shown in figure 3. Note that
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NUMBER FAILURE CODES CODES
1 2, 3, 4 NONE
2 2, 4 NONE
3 2, 4, 6" NONE
4 2,4,6* 3
5 2,6" 4.3
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The general routine of using only obsolete failure with
suspensions did not produce data compatible to actual life data
of SSME parts. Also, the computer graph for MI reflects
inability to recognize extreme points (see figure 4). The
maximum likelihood graph is not as easily influenced by the
presence of an extreme point since it is totally derived by
computations (see figure 5).
Main Injector (MI)
Model I for MI resulted in a beta considerably smaller than
I (Beta = 0.6218367). Yet, multiple failure modes may exist (see
figure 6). The graph done by the computer appears not to
represent a failure mode for model I. The graph is of a centroid
nature. Model 2 for the MI has a distinct failure mode (see
figure 7) yet, the actual performance of the SSME part is not
defined at the B.01 of B.05 life level. Model 3 for the MI is
the same as model 2. Model 4 also generate a distinct single
failure mode (see figure 8) which is not compatible with
available performance data. For the MI, model 5 generates a beta
of 3.828949 and has a reasonable B.01 and B.05 life (see figure
9).
Nozzle
Models I and 2 both produced multiple failure modes since
the betas were 1.12763 and 0.9750785, respectively (see figures
10 and 11). Model 2 and model 3 are the same due to the data.
Multiple failure modes are still evident for the nozzle (see
figure 12). The beta of 0.9189662 and the additional graphing by
eye indicates more than one failure mode (see figure 13) for
model 5. The B.01 life and B.05 life indicated by model 5 on the
computer is totally irrational for B.01 occurs before firing.
Powerhead
Model I for the powerhead generates a beta of 1.354549 which
reflects possibly no multiple failure modes. Yet, by eye a few
could exist (see figure 14). Model 2 has a beta value which does
not reflect random failure; however, the B.01 and B.05 life is
not realistic for actual data. By eye, several failure modes
could exist (see figure 15). Notice the lines by eye show slopes
of failure beyond 1200 seconds which is more eompatable to real
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failure modes. For model 3 (see figure 16) the other visible
failure modes are closer to expected life the results is similar
to model 2. Moaei L_ has no extensive chan_ ia the aumbei _ of
failure modes (see figure 17). Model 5 (see figure 18) shows
possibly some filtering process yet the results does not
sufficiently represent real data.
Main Combustion Chambers (MCC)
Model I for the MCC reflects the generation of a multiple
failure modes (see figure 19). Model 2 has most of the variance
in betas as model I (see figure 20). Model 6 shows no alteration
as far as fewer failure modes (see figure 21).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
The generation of betas within a small interval of I
reflects what is happening to most SSME parts. For, the safety
factors generate pseudo failure modes. The basis of the
previously mentioned conjecture is that the cycle to complete
failure is interrupted by a variety of procedures. These
procedures are maintenance schedules, visual inspection, and a
need for accessibility when maintaining other parts. For this
study, the parts studied are basically classified as being in the
same group. The models for the different part tended to generate
similar multiple failure modes patterns. The constant failure
rate reflects some consistency in maintenance management rather
than parts behavior. Hence, the categories for failure must be
assessed using some criteria as to what is to be examined. The
computer program used for this study is blind to examining
multiple failure modes or extreme points when graphing by
ranking.
Recommendations
Due to the excessive amount of time it took to code failure
modes, I am recommending that a very carefully though-out record
keeping procedure be started (see figure 22). Any part removed
from the SSME should be categorized immediately and the life
management files should be augmented by computer. Design
alterations should be clearly identified as being distinct from
repair due to some problem. The removal of any part from service
must be fully coded. Retirement reason should be spelled out as
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to whether it is due to the inability to perform the work of the
original design or whether a new design is being used. For those
parts where failure is not precisely defined, the engineers
monitoring and studying the part should have a consistent
agreement on procedures to help eliminate subjectivity. The
sensitivity of new materials used for parts must be examined by
looking at the mathematical behavior for: (I) stress versus
temperature in various environments, (2) alternating stress versus
cycles, (3) elongation pet versus temperature, (4) reduction of
area part versus temperature, and (5) specific heat BTU/LB-F
versus temperature. Factorial Experiments as in the book by
Patrick O'Connor are needed to assist the engineer in deciding
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